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Performance and Performance Persistence of UK 
Closed-End Equity Funds  
 
 
1. Introduction  
In the UK, closed-end funds (CEF) are an asset class which has often been overlooked 
by investors, who mainly focus on open-end funds.  Nevertheless, particularly for retail investors, 
closed-end funds provide an attractive investment alternative to open-end funds, as fees are 
often substantially lower.  Restrictions on advertising and a less favorable commission structure 
for financial advisors are reasons why closed-end funds have remained a niche market in the UK 
asset management industry.  Investors in closed-end funds also have to consider changes in the 
discount, whereby the net asset value (NAV) of the fund and the price of the fund can diverge 
substantially – hence, the need to distinguish between the NAV return, which measures the 
performance of the fund manager, and the fund-price return to the investor.   
 
Research on closed-end funds in the UK and US, has focused  mainly on causes of the 
discount (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 1990; Gemmill and Thomas 2002); relatively few studies focus 
on the performance of these funds and no studies (to our knowledge) have used closed-end 
funds to separate skill from luck by applying the false discovery rate (FDR).  The impact of ‘luck’ 
in multiple hypothesis tests arises whenever we ask the question: ‘How many of our statistically 
significant results are likely to be ‘truly null?’ – that is ‘false discoveries’. In this paper we use the 
false discovery rate which measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds, 
whose performance has been found to be statistically significant.  We assess the alpha-
performance of the UK closed-end funds over the period November 1990 to January 2013 using 
a monthly data set, free of survivorship bias. If we simply count the number of funds which are 
found to have a statistically significant performance measure, we run the risk of including funds 
which are truly null (i.e. Type I errors).  For example, suppose the FDR amongst 20 statistically 
significant positive-alpha funds is 80%, then this implies that only 4 funds (out of the 20) have 
truly significant alphas - this is clearly useful information for investors.  A key issue is whether this 
correction gives different inferences from the standard approach of simply ‘counting’ the number 
of significant funds with non-zero abnormal performance.   
 
Another important element in performance measurement is the factor model used.  We 
assess individual fund performance using self-declared benchmarks.  However, noting that there 
may be style drift (Sensoy 2009), we augment this one-factor model with global factors related to 
size, value, and momentum.  No other studies, to our knowledge, attempt to measure closed-end 
fund performance using the funds’ self-declared benchmarks.   
 
We also address the issue of performance persistence. We sort funds into (decile) 
portfolios based on a number of different metrics which capture the skill of the fund manager (i.e. 
NAV performance).  The portfolios are frequently rebalanced and we then assess the subsequent 
alpha-performance. This recursive portfolio approach is analysed for a number of different 
portfolio formation rules and factor models. 
 
From a total of 330 UK closed-end funds, our final sample of around 300 funds over the 
period November 1990 to January 2013 provides a large comprehensive data set (largely free of 
survivorship bias). This paper contributes to the literature by assessing individual-fund 
performance relative to its self-declared benchmark (as well as other risk factors) and adjusts the 
number of statistically significant alphas for the presence of false discoveries. For individual fund 
performance we find that around 75% of funds neither statistically beat nor are inferior to their 
benchmarks – this applies across all three factor models used.  Next, there is a much higher 
proportion of false discoveries among the worst (negative alpha) funds than amongst the best 
performing funds – so the standard method of simply counting the number of funds with 
‘significant’ test statistics can be far more misleading for ‘losers’ than for ‘winners’.  Third, the truly 
significant positive-alpha and negative-alpha funds appear to be concentrated in the extreme tails 
of the cross-section of fund performance.   
 
For persistence in performance, we find that sorting into decile portfolios on past 
performance produces some positive post-sort alphas using fund-price returns in a one-factor 
model but many more statistically significant post-sort alphas when using a four-factor model.  
 
Previous Studies  
Before examining the literature on the performance of CEF, it is worth briefly commenting 
on results from open-end funds. The literature on US open-end-fund performance is voluminous 
with less work being done on UK funds; most studies examine funds that invest domestically. It is 
well documented that the average US or UK open-end equity fund underperforms its benchmarks 
(Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka 1993; Fletcher 1997; Blake and Timmermann 1998; Wermers 
2000; Quigley and Sinquefield 2000).  However, the cross-section standard deviation of alphas 
for individual funds in both the UK and US is high, and while some studies do find a few funds 
with statistically significant positive alphas, many more funds record negative alphas (Malkiel 
1995; Kosowski, Timmermann, White and Wermers 2006; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O’Sullivan 
2008; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O’Sullivan 2012, Fama and French 2010,).   
 Studies which investigate possible sources of skillful and unskillful open-end funds are 
almost exclusively based on US data. Past winner funds attract additional fund flows (Del Guercio 
and Tkac 2008; Keswani and Stolin 2008; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2009) and this may lead to 
diseconomies of scale (Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik 2004; Yan 2008), dilution effects (Edelen 
1999), distorted trading decisions (Alexander, Cici, and Gibson 2007; Coval and Stafford 2007; 
Pollet and Wilson 2008) or manager changes (Khorana 1996, 2001; Bessler, Blake, Luckoff, and 
Tonks 2010) – all of which in turn may affect future performance.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, poorly performing funds are subject to ‘external governance’ (fund outflows) and 
‘internal governance’ (manager changes) which also influence their future performance (Dangl, 
Wu and Zechner 2008; Bessler et al. 2010).   
 
  Closed-end funds, unlike open-end funds, are never forced to liquidate securities or 
purchase additional securities due to fund inflows and outflows.  Instead, changes in demand for 
the fund lead to a widening or narrowing of the discount and hence changes in investors’ returns.  
Persistence in the performance may therefore be stronger than for open-end funds because 
sentiment in favour of a closed-end fund might lead to an increased demand for the fund by 
additional (retail) investors which, with a given fund size, may lead to higher future fund returns. 
In contrast, an increase in demand for a particular open-end fund will be met by an increased 
inflow and increased purchases across a wide range of stocks, where the future price impact may 
be relatively small.  CEF’s can also invest in illiquid securities (Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton 2009) 
and use leverage (Elton, Gruber, Blake, and Shachar 2013) – this may also result in more 
positive alphas and performance persistence of active strategies, than for open-end funds. 
 
The literature on closed-end fund performance in the US and UK is relatively sparse. 
Bers and Madura (2000), using US funds with a domestic mandate, find evidence of positive 
persistence for NAV and fund-price returns, based on the correlation between estimated alphas in 
successive periods. Positive persistence is also found for US funds with a foreign mandate 
although the level of persistence is less than that for domestic funds (Madura and Bers 2002). 
More recently, Elyasiani and Jia (2011) evaluate fund-price and NAV persistence using 86 US 
equity funds. They find, however, evidence of only very weak persistence when the funds are 
evaluated against median risk-adjusted industry performance.   
  
In the UK, Bangassa (1999) finds no evidence of individual funds with positive alphas and 
little evidence of positive alphas when funds are grouped into 10 investment styles. Using daily 
data on 9 portfolios with both domestic and international mandates, Bangassa, Su, and Joseph 
(2012) find mixed evidence on alpha performance which depends upon the investment mandate 
and the factor model used.  
 
In this paper we add to the literature by assessing the performance of individual UK 
closed-end funds using their self-declared benchmarks (and other risk factors) after adjusting for 
false discoveries. We also examine performance persistence using different sorting rules and 
different factor models for post-formation returns.  The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 
we briefly discuss the methodology behind the FDR and other methods of controlling for false 
positives in a multiple testing framework.  In section 3 we look at performance models, in section 
4 we present our empirical results; section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2.  The False Discovery Rate 
The standard approach to determining whether the alpha of a single fund demonstrates 
skill or luck is to choose a rejection region and associated significance level and to reject the null 
of ‘no outperformance’ if the test statistic lies in the rejection region - ‘luck’ is interpreted as the 
significance level chosen.  However, using    = 5% when testing the alphas for each of M-funds, 
the probability of finding at least one non-zero alpha-fund in sample of M-funds is much higher 
than 5% (even if all funds have true alphas of zero).1 Put another way, if we find 20 out of 200 
funds (i.e. 10% of funds) with significant positive estimated alphas when using a 5% significance 
level then some of these will merely be lucky.   
  
In testing the performance of many funds a balanced approach is needed - one which is 
not too conservative but allows a reasonable chance of identifying those funds with truly 
differential performance.  An approach known as the false discovery rate (FDR) attempts to strike 
this balance by classifying funds as ‘significant’ (at a chosen significance level) and then asks the 
question ‘What proportion of these significant funds are false discoveries?’ – that is, those that 
are truly null (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995; Storey 2002; Storey, Taylor, and Siegmund 2004).                
The FDR measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds which have been found 
to have significant (individual) alphas and hence ‘measures’ luck among the pool of ‘significant 
funds’. Storey (2002) and Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) provide a detailed account of the 
FDR methodology, so it is only briefly summarized below.  The null hypothesis that fund-i has no 
skill in security selection (alpha) and the alternative of either positive or negative performance is: 
                                                 
1  This probability is the compound type-I error.  For example, if the M tests are independent then Pr(at least 1 
false discovery) = 1 – (1-   )M  = zM , which for a relatively small number of  M=50 funds and conventional   = 0.05 gives 
zM = 0.92 – a high probability of observing at least one false discovery. 
     0 : 0iH        : 0A iH    or  0i     
 
A ‘significant fund’ is one for which the p-value for the test statistic (e.g. t-statistic on 
alpha) is less than or equal to some threshold / 2  ( 0 1   ).  At a given significance level   
the probability that a zero-alpha fund exhibits ‘good luck’ is / 2  .  If the proportion of truly zero-
alpha funds in the population of M-funds is 0   then the expected proportion of false positives (or 
‘lucky funds’) is: 
 
   [1]  ( )E F

=  0 ( / 2)  
 
If ( )E S

 is the expected proportion of significant positive-alpha funds, then the 
expected proportion of truly skilled funds (at a significance level   ) is: 
 
[2] 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( / 2)E T E S E F E S     
        
 
Varying    allows us to see if the number of truly skillful funds rises appreciably with    or not, 
which tells us whether skilled funds are concentrated or dispersed in the right tail of the cross-
sectional distribution. An estimate of the true proportion of skilled (unskilled) funds 
A

  (
A

 ) in 
the population of M-funds is: 
 
[3]  *A T
    *A T
   
 
where 
*  is a sufficiently high significance level which can be determined using the mean 
squared error criterion (Barras et al. 2010).  The expected FDR amongst the statistically 
significant positive-alpha funds is: 
     
[4]  
0
( ) ( / 2)
( ) ( )
E F
FDR
E S E S


 
 


 
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The proportion of truly positive-alpha skilled funds amongst the statistically significant 
positive-alpha funds is: 
 [5]  ( ) / ( ) 1E T E S FDR  
     
 
The observed number of significant funds S

 provides an estimate of ( )E S

. To 
provide an estimate of 0 , the proportion of truly null funds  in the population of M-funds,  we use 
the result that truly alternative features have p-values clustered around zero, whereas truly null p-
values are uniformly distributed, U(0,1).  To estimate 
0
ˆ ( )   we can simply choose a value    
for which the histogram of p-values becomes flat and use: 
 
[6]  0ˆ ( )  = 
#{ }( )
(1 ) (1 )
ipW
M M

 

 
 
 
 
where ( ) /W M   is the area of the histogram to the right of the chosen value of   (on the x-
axis of the histogram) – see Figure 4.  For example suppose 0 = 100% and we choose   = 0.2. 
Then ( ) /W M  = 80% of p-values lie to the right of   = 0.2 and our estimate of 0   = 80%/ (1-
0.2) = 100% as expected.  For truly alternative funds (i.e. 0i  ), the histogram of p-values has 
a “spike” near zero.  But if the histogram of p-values is perfectly flat to the right of   then our 
estimate of 0   is independent of the choice of  .  So, if we were able to count only truly null p-
values then [6] would give an unbiased estimate of 0 .  However, if we erroneously include a few 
alternative p-values then [6] provides a conservative estimate of 0   and hence of the FDR.   
 
The bias in the estimate of 0ˆ ( )    is decreasing in    (as the chances of including non-
zero alpha-funds diminishes) but its variance increases with   (as we include fewer p-values in 
our estimation).  Hence an alternative estimate of  0  is to choose   to minimize the mean-
square error 
2
0 0{ ( ) }E     (Storey 2002, Barras et al. 2010)
2 . 
 
We use a bootstrap approach to calculate p-values of estimated t-statistics because of 
the non-normality in regression residuals (Politis and Romano 1994; Kosowski et al. 2006).  The 
                                                 
2  Barras et al.  (2010) use a Monte Carlo study  to show that the estimators  outlined above are accurate, are not 
sensitive either to the method used to estimate 0   or to the chosen significance level   .  The estimators are also 
robust to the typical cross-sectional dependence in fund residuals (which tend to be low in monthly data).    
 
estimated factor model of returns is:  , ,
ˆˆ ˆ'i t i i t i tr X e     for i = 1, 2, … M funds, where  iT  = 
number of observations on fund-i,  tir ,  = excess return on fund-i, tX  = vector of risk factors,  ,iˆ te  
are the residuals and 
iˆt  is the (Newey-West) t-statistic for alpha.  We draw a random sample 
(with replacement) of length iT   from the residuals ,iˆ te  and use these bootstrap residuals tie ,
~  to 
generate an excess return series tir ,
~  = ,
ˆ0 'i t i tX e   under the null hypothesis i  = 0. Using  
tir ,
~   the performance model is estimated and the resulting t-statistic for the alpha-performance 
measure, 
b
it   is obtained.  This is repeated B = 10,000 times and for a two-sided, equal-tailed test 
the bootstrap p-value for the alpha of fund-i is: 
  
[7]  
1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ2.min[ ( ), ( )]
B B
b b
i i i i i
b b
p B I t t B I t t 
 
     
 
where (.)I is a (1,0) indicator variable.  The above ‘basic bootstrap’ uses residual-only 
resampling, under the null of no outperformance (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).3  A similar 
procedure is used for other hypothesis tests4. 
 
3.  Performance Models  
 
Individual Fund Performance 
The performance of individual closed-end funds can be measured using either fund-price 
returns or NAV returns – the latter measuring the performance of the manager of the fund and the 
former measuring the return to the investor. The difference between these two measures of 
performance is the change in the closed-end fund discount. 
 
 Our performance models are well known ‘factor models’ and therefore are only 
described briefly below.  When considering the performance of individual fund excess returns we 
make use of the self-declared benchmark return of the fund (in excess of the risk-free rate), 
,bi tr   
and consider the following models: 
                                                 
3  Alternative bootstrapping procedures such as simultaneously bootstrapping the residuals and the  independent   
variables, or allowing for serial correlation (block bootstrap) or contemporaneous bootstrap across all (existing) funds at 
time t, produced qualitatively similar results, hence we only report results for the ‘residuals only’ bootstrap. 
 
4  The FDR seems to have been used first in testing the difference between genes in particular cancer cells 
(Storey 2002) and has recently been used in the economics literature to assess the performance of alternative forecasting 
rules in foreign exchange (McCracken and Sapp 2005), stock returns (Bajgrowicz and Scaillett 2012), hedge funds (Criton 
and Scaillet 2011) and to analyze US equity mutual fund performance (Barras et al.  2010).   
 Excess Benchmark Return Model (EBRM): 
[8] 
, , ,i t bi t i i tr r      
 
One-Factor Benchmark Model (1FBM): 
[9] 
, 1 , ,i t i i bi t i tr r      
 
Four-Factor Benchmark Model (4FBM): 
[10] 
, 1 , 2 3 4 ,i t i i bi t i t i t i t i tr r SMB HML MOM            
 
where 
,i tr  is the excess return over the risk-free rate, and tSMB , tHML  and tMOM  are global 
risk factors which capture size, book-to-market, and momentum, respectively (Fama and French 
1993; Carhart 1997). The excess benchmark return model (EBRM) assumes the fund tracks its 
self-designated benchmark with zero expected tracking error. Recent studies (Sensoy 2009), 
however, have shown that many funds deviate from their self-declared benchmarks and this is 
accounted for in the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) where the benchmark beta is not 
constrained to be unity, and in the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM) where global risk factors 
are also included. Equation [10] is widely used to measure open-end fund performance and 
should also be applicable to closed-end counterparts.  
 
Portfolio Performance  
In the sample, there are over 100 different self-designated benchmarks. Hence when 
considering the performance of portfolios of closed-end funds (e.g. equally-weighted portfolios) 
we cannot use the self-declared benchmark returns 
,bi tr  because these may differ for each fund 
in the portfolio.  Instead, we evaluate the return performance of portfolios (in excess of the risk-
free rate) 
,p tr , using the a global market return ,m tr  (in excess of the risk-free rate) in place of the 
self-declared benchmark; this gives a one-factor global model, (1FGM). When augmented by 
tSMB and tHML  we obtain our three-factor global model (3FGM). Finally, adding a global 
momentum variable tMOM  our four-factor global model (4FGM) is:  
 [11] , 1 , 2 3 4 ,p t i p m t p t p t p t p tr r SMB HML MOM            
 
 
 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
 
The sample comprises 298 closed-end equity funds traded on the London Stock 
Exchange. Of these 298 funds, 76 funds have a mandate to invest in UK markets; 59 funds in Far 
East and Asian markets; 46 funds in global markets and 43 funds in European markets.  There 
are 52 specialist funds, the majority investing in hedge funds or private equity.  The remaining 22 
funds invest in the US and in emerging markets. There is a degree of subjectivity in this 
classification. When a fund has a mandate such as, say, ‘Investing in European technology 
companies’, we classify such a fund as ‘European’.  However when a fund has a mandate, say, 
‘Investing in technology companies’ but without being restricted to a particular geographic region, 
such a fund is classified as ‘specialist’.  We classify a fund as ‘global’ where it has global mandate 
but is not restricted to investing in a particular industry or activity.  
 
In cases where the fund declares a particular benchmark, the choice is clear-cut. 
However in many cases, and particularly early in the sample period, funds did not declare a 
particular benchmark. In these cases, a benchmark is selected that best matched the investment 
mandate of the individual fund. Thus, for example, the benchmark selected for Medicx plc - a 
closed-end fund launched in August 2006 and investing in primary healthcare properties in the 
UK - is the FTSE All Share Index for Healthcare Equipment and Services. For the 76 funds 
investing in the UK market, a total of 11 individual benchmarks are used.     
 
 Monthly NAV and fund-price returns (including reinvested dividends) for the individual 
funds are from Datastream. Most of the self-declared benchmarks are available from January 
1975, but the global factors used in our multifactor models are only available from November 
1990 onwards. Our sample period is therefore from November 1990 to January 2013.  The global 
risk factors are from Kenneth French’s website (converted into pounds sterling) with the one-
month LIBOR as the risk-free rate. The analysis includes only those funds with at least 18 
monthly observations, giving us NAV returns for 292 funds and fund-price returns for 298 funds; 
this is close to the entire universe of 330 UK closed-end funds. 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for NAV and fund-price returns over the sample 
period. Three alternative models are used – the excess return benchmark model (ERBM), the 
one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM).   
 
[Table 1 – here] 
 
We consider first the results for NAV returns. The number of statistically significant 
positive alpha funds (at a 5% significance level) increases as we move from the most restricted 
model to the least restricted model.  Thus, as we move from the ERBM to the 1FBM and to the 
4FBM, the percentage of statistically significant positive alphas increases from 5.8% to 8.9% to 
14.7%, respectively.  On the other hand, the percentage of statistically significant negative alphas 
stays reasonably constant (around 5%) across all three models.  The average NAV-return’s alpha 
across all funds is negative for all three factor models – similar to results reported for open-end 
funds in the US and UK (see, for example, Kosowski et al. 2006; Cuthbertson et al. 2008; Fama 
and French 2010). The coefficient on the self-designated benchmark is constant at around 0.81 in 
the 1FBM and 4FBM models with the latter model indicating  a positive loading on tSMB  and a 
negative loading on both tHML  and tMOM . The average 
2R increases from 61.5% for the 
1FBM to 66.8% for the 4FBM - this suggests using the 4FBM when assessing the performance of 
individual funds. The average 
2R  for closed-end funds is higher than that found when similar 
factor models are estimated for hedge funds.  For example, Capocci and Hubner (2004) report 
average 
2R  of 44% for a one-factor model and 60% for a four-factor model applied to hedge fund 
returns.   
 
Results for fund-price returns are, for the most part, broadly similar to those for NAV 
returns although the number of statistically significant positive alphas is smaller while there are no 
negative alphas. The signs on the three factors are the same as those for the NAV returns but the 
factor loadings are larger.  The average 
2R using fund-price returns is lower than when using 
NAV returns – implying that the four factors fail to pick up all the variation in the discount. The 
main difference between the NAV and the fund-price regressions is that the former give negative 
average alphas whereas the latter give a positive average alpha for the 1FBM (0.36% p.a.) and 
4FBM (1.53% p.a.).  All three models for individual CEF returns have about 60-70% of funds with 
(statistically significant) non-normal residuals (Bera-Jarque test, at 5% significance level) – thus 
motivating the use of bootstrap procedures in testing fund performance.  
 
To obtain further insight into the importance of the risk factors in explaining the 
performance of the average fund, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of all the funds and 
examine the recursive parameter estimates for the NAV and fund-price returns. 
 
     [Table 2 here]  
   
For the one-factor global model (1FGM), the average alpha is positive but statistically 
insignificant for both NAV and fund-price returns (Table 2, Panel A).  However, with the four-
factor global model (Table 2, Panel B), the average alpha is positive and significant and all factors 
are statistically significant in both NAV and fund-price regressions.  For fund-price returns, the 
recursive estimates of alpha (Figure 1), the betas for the excess market return, tSMB  and 
tMOM  coefficients are reasonably constant and well determined, with the tHML  factor less so 
(Figure 2)5. The above results point towards using a four-factor model when assessing the 
performance of a portfolio of funds, using either NAV or fund-price returns.  
 
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
Individual Fund Performance and the FDR 
In view of the above results, we first assess performance using NAV returns of individual 
CEF and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM - equation [10]). We then discuss the false 
discovery rate results for the excess benchmark return model (EBRM - equation [8]) and the one-
factor benchmark model (1FBM - equation [9]) as part of our robustness tests.   
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The distribution of alpha estimates (NAV returns) for the four-factor benchmark model 
shows a wide range of values (Figure 3).  Most NAV-alphas are in the negative to 10.5% p.a. 
range but there are some funds in the extreme tails of the distribution which may have extremely 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ security selection.  This is important, since investors are more interested in holding 
funds in the right tail of the performance distribution and avoiding those in the extreme left tail, 
than they are in the average fund’s performance. This emphasizes the importance of examining 
fund-by-fund performance (rather than the weighted average of all funds) and then correcting for 
false discoveries to provide an assessment of overall industry performance. 
 
                                                 
5 Recursive regression results are qualitatively similar when we use NAV returns. 
Using NAV returns and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM), we discuss estimates 
of the proportion of truly zero-alpha funds 0 , positively skilled alpha-funds, A

 and unskilled 
funds 
A

 among our total of M-funds.  We then analyze the false discovery rate for the positive-
alpha and negative-alpha funds taken separately; this allows us to ascertain whether such funds 
are concentrated in the tails of the performance distribution6. 
 
Estimation of 
0   
The histogram of bootstrap p-values for the 4FBM when testing 0 : 0iH    across funds 
is given in Figure 4.  Exploiting the fact that truly null p-values are uniformly distributed [0, 1], the 
height of the flat portion of the histogram gives an estimate of the proportion of truly null-alpha 
funds 0 .  From Figure 4 a reasonable ‘eyeball’ estimate would be   = 0.2 giving 0ˆ ( )   = 0.8.   
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Taking the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM) and our universe of all M-funds, the 
MSE-bootstrap estimator gives the percentage of truly zero alpha funds 0ˆ ( )  = 76% (se = 4.2), 
the percentage of negative-alpha funds ˆ
A

 = 16.7% (se = 4.0) and skilled funds ˆ
A

= 7.5% (se = 
1.4) – Table 3.  It is the estimate of 0ˆ ( )  which determines our FDR (for alpha) and this is 
statistically well determined because the estimation uses data on a large number of null funds.   
Standard errors are in parentheses and are given in Genovese and Wasserman 2004 (and 
Barras et al. 2010, Appendix A).  Hence in the whole population of funds, most have truly zero 
alphas, but there is a small proportion of funds with statistically positive or negative alphas.  We 
now examine the location of these non-zero alpha funds. 
 
As we increase the significance level  , the number of statistically significant positive 
alpha funds S

 (Table 3, Panel A) and negative alpha funds S

 (Table 3,Panel B) increases.  
However, FDR

 andFDR

 also increase so that the proportion of truly skilled funds T

 and 
truly unskilled funds T

 does not vary substantially with . This implies that the skilled and 
unskilled funds lie predominantly in the extreme tails (i.e. for 0.05  ), rather than being evenly 
spread throughout the tails.   
                                                 
6 As noted below, the results using different models to estimate 0  are qualitatively similar.   
 
[Table 3 here]  
 
The histogram of p-values when testing 0 : 0iH    for the excess benchmark return 
model (EBRM) and the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) are similar to those for the four-
factor benchmark model (4FBM) in Figure 4 (and are not presented here).  This results in broadly 
similar values for 
0  as for the 4FBM - 0 is equal to 86.5% for ERBM and 79.0% for 1FBM 
(Table 4, Panels A and B).   
 
[Table 4 here]  
 
Across the three models a salient feature is the resultant fall in FDR

 and the rise in the 
number of truly skilled funds T

  as we move from the Excess Return Benchmark Model (ERBM) 
to the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM in Table 4) and then to the four-factor benchmark 
model (4FBM in Table3).  For example, for   =0.10 we have FDR

 equal to 48.3%, 26.8% and 
20.1% and T

 equal to 4.6% , 10.8% and 15.0% when moving from  ERBM to 1FBM and to 
4FBM respectively. 
 
Turning now to negative-alpha funds, we find that as we move from the Excess Return 
Benchmark Model (EBRM) to the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM in Table 4) and then to the  
four-factor benchmark model (4FBM in Table 3), the number of truly negative skilled funds (   
=0.10) remains largely constant with T

= 4.9%, 2.6%, and 3.7% of the funds, respectively. 
 
The above results which use self-declared benchmarks are not a like-for-like comparison 
across funds and this might influence the cross-section of alphas7.  As a robustness test we 
therefore use a common global benchmark (in place of the self-declared benchmarks) but this 
does not appreciably alter the results in table 3.  For example, if we take a significance level of   
= 10% then the number of truly skilled funds is T

= 15% (se=2.6%) in table 3 (4FBM) and T

= 
18.7% (se=2.7%) when using the common global benchmark (4FGM) - so the results are 
qualitatively similar.  For unskilled funds we have T

= 3.7% (se= 1.9%) in table 3 and T

= 0.9% 
(se= 1.6%) for the 4FGM – hence although the point estimates differ they are both statistically 
                                                 
7  This issue was raised by an anonymous referee. 
equal to zero. In addition, using the self-declared benchmarks gives an average 
2R of 66.6% 
(across all funds) while using the common global benchmark has an average 
2R  of 52.2%.   
 
Persistence in Portfolios of CEF  
Using NAV returns, we have established that there is some positive and some negative 
manager skill in security selection (alpha) when holding individual funds over the whole sample 
period. We now wish to examine whether forming portfolios by switching between different funds 
gives a positive-alpha performance in the post-formation period.  
 
We form portfolios using a rolling window based on either the excess benchmark return 
model (EBRM) or on past t-alphas from the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) – using NAV 
returns (ie. based on individual manager skill over the formation period). Our performance 
measure is based on fund-price returns in the post-formation period.8  We report results for post-
formation alphas using a formation period of 12f  months and for alternative holding periods h 
= 12, 3, 1 months. Because the post-formation portfolios contain funds with different investment 
objectives, it is not possible to estimate a post-formation factor model which incorporates all the 
self-declared benchmarks. Hence, we use the one- and four-factor global models to assess the 
post-formation alphas (for fund-price returns).   
 
Post-formation decile-sorted portfolio alphas, together with their bootstrap p-values are 
reported for funds sorted by the excess benchmark return model (EBRM) in Table 5 and by the t-
alpha of the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) in Table 6.  In each table, Panel A reports the 
results for the post-formation alphas of the one-factor global model (1FGM), Panel B reports 
those of the three-factor global model (3FGM) and Panel C those of the four-factor global model 
(4FGM).  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Funds Sorted using EBRM 
When we sort funds based on the excess benchmark return model (EBRM) and evaluate 
the post-formation alphas for fund-price returns using the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM in 
Table 5, Panel A), we find about 4 out of the 10 decile portfolios have statistically significant post-
formation alphas (at a 5% significance level) but there is no clear pattern of past ‘winners’ 
                                                 
8 It seems unlikely that (predominantly) retail investors would be concerned with an active strategy where the post-
formation performance is based on NAV returns, because investors cannot easily mimic  this outcome since it requires 
detailed and timely information on portfolio weights used by managers.    
 
remaining ‘winners’, except when we use , (12,1)f h   when there is persistence in winner 
funds for deciles 1 to 3.  When evaluating the post-formation alphas using the three-factor global 
model (3FGM in Panel B) or four-factor global model (4FGM in Panel C), we find more positive 
post-formation alphas for all deciles and for all three combinations of ( , )f h .  
 
When moving from the one-factor global model (IFGM) to the four-factor global model 
(4FGM), the increase in the number of decile portfolios with statistically significant positive post-
formation alphas is partly due to a reduction in residual variance (indicated by an increase in 
of around 10% for each decile portfolio) and also to an increase in the point estimates of post-
formation alphas. With the standard errors of the alphas remaining largely constant, the latter 
leads to an increase in the statistical significance of the decile portfolio alphas.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
Funds Sorted using t-alpha of 1FBM 
The same pattern of results reported above, applies when funds are sorted on the t-alpha 
of the one-factor benchmark model (rather than EBRM) and evaluated using the global models 
(Table 6, Panels A, B, and C).   
 
Irrespective of whether we form portfolios based on excess returns over fund-specific 
self-declared benchmarks EBRM (Table 5) or on the t-alphas of the one-factor benchmark model 
(Table 6), we obtain much stronger evidence of positive post-formation alphas, when using the 
four-factor global model ( , , ,mr SMB HML MOM ) rather than the one-factor global model ( mr ). 
This applies for all three rebalancing periods h = 1,3, and 12 months.9  These results are in 
contrast to those reported for the UK and US open-end fund industry using a four-factor model 
where there is little evidence of positive post-formation alphas and much stronger evidence 
negative post-formation alphas.   
 
Funds Sorted using t-alpha of 4FBM 
As a further robustness test we take account of the fact that for closed-end funds, price-
returns (to the investor) may exhibit greater momentum than for mutual funds – since the 
premium or discount may persist (and this is not reflected in NAV returns).  We therefore form 
portfolios of funds based on the t-alpha of the 4FBM (ie. including a momentum variable) using 
price-returns and use the 4FGM (with price-returns) as in table 6, to measure the post-formation 
                                                 
9 Recursive least squares analysis of the post-formation alphas reveals that it is only post-2001 that the alphas are 
statistically significant.   
2R
performance. We again find a substantial number of positive-alpha decile portfolios in the post-
formation period (table 7)10. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Which performance model should we use?  For the four-factor global model, all four 
factors in the post-formation regressions are statistically significant for all deciles and the ’s of 
70%-75% suggest that these global factors capture most of the variability in fund-price portfolio 
returns.  Whether the four-factor global model  is the ‘correct’ model for closed-end funds could 
be debated but, for example, the four factors explain more of the variation in closed-end fund 
returns than do factor models applied to hedge fund returns – where positive alpha performance 
is also found.  As both hedge funds and closed-end funds can hold heterogeneous portfolios and 
use leverage (whereas open-end funds cannot), this provides one possible reason for the positive 
post-formation alphas for closed-end funds. 
 
5. Conclusion  
We use the false discovery rate to assess the overall alpha-performance of UK closed-
end funds using self-declared benchmarks and additional risk factors.  We find evidence that 
around 16% of the funds in our sample have truly positive alphas (using a four-factor model that 
includes a self-designated benchmark or where the latter is replaced by a global benchmark).  
The number of truly negative alpha funds is around 1-4% of our sample of funds and is largely 
invariant to the factor model used.  This is a better performance overall than UK and US open-
end funds where around 0%-5% of the positive alpha funds and 25% of the negative alpha funds 
are found to be statistically significant. 
 
Examining persistence in performance, we find that positive post-formation alpha fund 
performance depends on the factor model used – there is some positive-alpha performance  
when post-formation returns are evaluated using a one-factor global market model but substantial 
positive-alpha performance is found  when using a four-factor global model.  The magnitude of 
the alpha increases as global risk factors proposed by Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
are included in our factor model.  If we accept the four-factor global model, then decile portfolios 
of closed-end funds give rise to positive post-formation alphas and fund performance more 
                                                 
10 This variant was suggested by an anonymous referee.  We also find  qualitatively similar results when we form 
portfolios of funds based on the t-alpha of the four-factor global model 4FGM using price-returns (rather than the 4FBM) 
and also use the 4FGM (with price-returns) in the post-formation period (as in tables 6 and 7) -  these results are available 
from the authors.  
 
2R
closely resembles the performance of hedge funds rather than open-end funds.  We conjecture 
that this may be due to closed-end funds being able to use leverage and not having to change 
portfolio allocations due to fund inflows and outflows.  Our overall results, from a performance 
perspective, suggest that there is prima facie evidence that closed-end funds could be a more 
attractive alternative to investors, (in particular retail investors) than open-end funds.    
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Figure 1 
 
Recursive Alpha: Fund-Price Returns, Four-Factor Global Model (4FGM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
  
Recursive Factor Betas: Fund-Price Returns, Four-Factor Global Model (4FGM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Alpha Estimates: NAV Returns, Four-Factor Benchmark Model (4FBM) 
 
Alphas (percentage, per month) are estimated using a four-factor model (4FBM) including the 
self-declared benchmark and global factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum.  The 
sample is from November 1990 to January 2013. Only funds with at least 18 monthly 
observations are included.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
 
Alpha p-values: NAV returns: Four-Factor Benchmark Model (4FBM) 
 
Bootstrap p-values under 0 : 0iH    for 292 funds with a minimum of 18 monthly observations 
over the period November 1990 to January 2013 for the four-factor model (4FBM), with NAV 
returns.  The four-factor model (4FBM) includes the self-declared benchmark and global factors 
for size, book-to-market, and momentum. 
 
 
 
 
 
p-values of skilled and unskilled 
funds 
Area to the right are p-
values of zero alpha funds 
Area under this line  
0 = [1/(1-]{#p>}/M  = 0.76 
=0.2 
Table 1  Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for all funds with at least 18 monthly observations.  The sample period is November 1990 to January 2013.  
There are 292 funds with an average of 154 monthly observations for NAV returns and 298 funds with an average of 152 monthly observations for 
fund-price returns. We report averages of the individual fund statistics for both NAV returns and fund-price returns using 3 models, The models are 
the excess benchmark return model (EBRM), the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM) which 
includes the self-declared fund benchmark and global factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum).  Newey-West heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are reported. The percentage of funds with non-normal residuals is based on the Bera-Jarque B-J 
statistic. Statistical significance is at the 5% significance level (two tail test). 
 
 
 
Excess Benchmark 
Return Model 
 
 
EBRM 
One-Factor 
Benchmark Model 
 
1FBM 
Four-Factor 
Benchmark Model 
 
4FBM 
 
NAV- 
Returns 
 
 
Fund-Price 
Returns 
 
NAV- 
Returns 
 
Fund-Price 
Returns 
 
NAV- 
Returns 
 
Fund-Price 
Returns 
% statistically significant 
positive alpha  
5.82% 3.02% 8.90% 3.69% 14.73% 10.07% 
% statistically significant 
negative alpha  
5.48% 0% 4.79% 0.67% 4.79% 0.34% 
Alpha  
(stdv) 
-0.0723 
(0.5505) 
-0.0056 
(0.5920) 
-0.0374 
(0.5411) 
0.0302 
(0.6063) 
-0.0115 
(0.5739) 
0.1275 
(0.6281) 
Self-declared benchmark 
(stdv) 
- - 0.8202 
(0.2979) 
0.8632 
(0.3163) 
0.8085 
(0.2906) 
0.8362 
(0.3125) 
SMB 
(stdv)  
- - - - 0.1760 
(0.2858) 
0.2503 
(0.4091) 
HML 
(stdv ) 
- - - - -0.0851 
(0.3225) 
-0.1145 
(0.4336) 
MOM 
(stdv) 
- - - - -0.0288 
(0.2219) 
-0.1370 
(0.3049) 
Mean 
2R  (%) N/A N/A 61.50 46.01 66.84 50.97 
% funds, non-normal 
residuals using B-J test 
70.89% 65.10% 71.23% 66.44% 61.99% 59.73% 
Table 2  Equally Weighted Portfolio of all CEF: Fund-Price and NAV Returns. 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients together with their t-statistics for the one-factor global model (1FGM) and the four-factor global model 
(4FGM) using an equally-weighted portfolio of all funds over the sample period January 1996 to December 2012.  The 1FGM uses the excess 
return on a global stock market index.  The 4FGM includes factors for the global stock market index and global size, book-to-market, and 
momentum variables. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics using Newey-West heteroscedastic and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. 
 
 
 
Panel A: 1FGM 
 
 Alpha Market 
Return 
SMB HML MOM 2R (%) 
Fund-
Price 
Returns 
0.1588 
(1.05) 
0.9239 
(16.91) 
- - - 74.30 
NAV 
Returns 
0.1087 
(0.90) 
0.8764 
(25.68) 
- - - 84.55 
 
Panel B: 4FGM 
 
 Alpha Market 
Return 
SMB HML MOM 2R (%) 
Fund-
Price 
Returns  
0.4245 
(2.67) 
0.8721 
(18.25) 
0.2827 
(4.49) 
-0.2420 
(-3.95) 
-0.2014 
(-4.26) 
80.25 
NAV 
Returns  
0.2581 
(2.48) 
0.8428 
(28.69) 
0.2211 
(5.23) 
-0.2138 
(-5.13) 
-0.0854 
(-3.05) 
88.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  False Discovery Rate: NAV Returns, Four-Factor Benchmark Model (4FBM)   
 
This table reports the false discovery rate statistics for NAV returns using the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM). The four factors are the self-
declared benchmark and the global risk factors SMB, HML and MOM.  The sample period is from November 1990 to January 2013 using 292 
funds with at least 18 monthly observations. p-values under the null 0  are calculated based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.     
 
 
NAV Returns 
 
0  0.7583   (0.0417) 
A

 0.0750   (0.0138) 
A

 0.1667   (0.0401) 
 
Positive Alpha Funds (164 funds) 
 
Sign. Level,    # significant 
funds 
FDR+ S+ T+ F+ 
0.05 42 0.1318 0.1438 
(0.0205) 
0.1249 
(0.0216) 
0.0190 
(0.0010) 
0.10 55 0.2013 0.1884 
(0.0229) 
0.1504 
(0.0260) 
0.0379 
(0.0021) 
0.15 65 0.2555 0.2226 
(0.0243) 
0.1657 
(0.0302) 
0.0569 
(0.0031) 
0.20 72 0.3075 0.2466 
(0.0252) 
0.1707 
(0.0344) 
0.0758 
(0.0042) 
 
Negative Alpha Funds (128 funds) 
 
Sign. Level,    # significant 
funds 
FDR- S- T- F- 
0.05 15 0.3690 0.0514 
(0.0129) 
0.0324 
(0.0141) 
0.0190 
(0.0010) 
0.10 22 0.5032 0.0753 0.0374 0.0379 
(0.0154) (0.0190) (0.0021) 
0.15 32 0.5190 0.1096 
(0.0183) 
0.0527 
(0.0247) 
0.0569 
(0.0031) 
0.20 36 0.6151 0.1233 
(0.0192) 
0.0475 
(0.0292) 
0.0758 
(0.0042) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  False Discovery Rate: NAV returns, Excess Benchmark Return Model (EBRM) and One-Factor Benchmark Model (1FBM)  
 
This table reports the false discovery rate statistics for two models. Panel A reports the statistics for the Excess Benchmark Return Model (EBRM) 
and panel B for the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM). The sample period is from November 1990 to January 2013 using 292 funds with at 
least 18 monthly observations on NAV returns. The p-values under the null 0  are calculated based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.    
 
 
 
Panel A : EBRM 
 
 
Panel B : 1FGM 
0  0.8659   (0.0408) 0  0.7903   (0.0450) 
A

 0.0299   (0.0090) 
A

 0.0474   (0.0107) 
A

 0.1041   (0.0399) 
A

 0.1623   (0.0440) 
 
Positive Alpha Funds (158 funds) 
 
 
Positive Alpha Funds (156 funds) 
Sign. Level, 
   
# Significant 
funds 
FDR+ S+ T+ F+ Sign. Level, 
   
# Significant 
funds 
FDR+ S+ T+ F+ 
0.05 16 0.3951 0.0548 
(0.0133) 
0.0331 
(0.0145) 
0.0216 
(0.0010) 
0.05 26 0.2219 0.0890 
(0.0167) 
0.0693 
(0.0178) 
0.0198 
(0.0011) 
0.10 26 0.4863 0.0890 
(0.0167) 
0.0457 
(0.0202) 
0.0433 
(0.0020) 
0.10 43 0.2683 0.1473 
(0.0207) 
0.1077 
(0.0241) 
0.0395 
(0.0022) 
0.15 40 0.4741 0.1370 
(0.0201) 
0.0720 
(0.0264) 
0.0649 
(0.0031) 
0.15 53 0.3266 0.1815 
(0.0226) 
0.1222 
(0.0289) 
0.0593 
(0.0034) 
0.20 43 0.5880 0.1473 
(0.0207) 
0.0607 
(0.0304) 
0.0866 
(0.0041) 
0.20 58 0.3979 0.1986 
(0.0233) 
0.1196 
(0.0332) 
0.0790 
(0.0045) 
 
Negative Alpha Funds  (134 funds) 
 
 
Negative Alpha Funds   (136 funds) 
Sign. Level, 
   
# Significant 
funds 
FDR- S- T- F- Sign. Level, 
   
# Significant 
funds 
FDR- S- T- F- 
0.05 14 0.4515 0.0479 
(0.0125) 
0.0263 
(0.0137) 
0.0216 
(0.0010) 
0.05 11 0.5245 0.0377 
(0.0111) 
0.0179 
(0.0125) 
0.0198 
(0.0011) 
0.10 27 0.4683 0.0925 
(0.0170) 
0.0492 
(0.0204) 
0.0433 
(0.0020) 
0.10 19 0.6073 0.0651 
(0.0144) 
0.0256 
(0.0184) 
0.0395 
(0.0022) 
0.15 38 0.4991 0.1301 
(0.0649) 
0.0652 
(0.0260) 
0.0649 
(0.0031) 
0.15 29 0.5968 0.0993 
(0.0175) 
0.0400 
(0.0245) 
0.0593 
(0.0034) 
0.20 41 0.6167 0.1404 
(0.0866) 
0.0538 
(0.0301) 
0.0866 
(0.0041) 
0.20 43 0.5367 0.1473 
(0.0207) 
0.0682 
(0.0310) 
0.0790 
(0.0045) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
  
Persistence in Alpha: Funds Sorted by Alpha using NAV Returns and the Excess Benchmark Return Model (EBRM)  
 
Funds are sorted into past ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ deciles using NAV returns and the Excess Benchmark Returns Model. The table reports alphas (and 
bootstrap p-values) for post-formation fund-price returns using the one-factor global model (1FGM, Panel A), the three-factor global model (3FGM, 
Panel B) and the four-factor global model (4FGM, Panel C). The formation (f) and holding (h) periods (f,h) are 12/12, 12/6 and 12/1 months.  The 
1FGM uses the excess return on a global stock market index, the 3FGM also includes global factors for size and book-to-market; the 4FGM adds 
a momentum variable.  The investment horizon is 17 years (204 months), starting in January 1996 and ending in December 2012.   
 
 
Panel A: 1FGM  
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 12/12 
 
 
(f,h)= 12/3 
 
(f,h)= 12/1 
alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.2363 0.2230 0.5456 0.3714 0.1010 0.5490 0.7071 0.0093 0.5235 
2 0.4144 0.0333 0.6393 0.4378 0.0257 0.6240 0.5936 0.0048 0.6145 
3 0.2511 0.0906 0.7074 0.4370 0.0064 0.7209 0.5087 0.0024 0.7250 
4 0.3092 0.0356 0.7307 0.2784 0.0586 0.7485 0.2576 0.0738 0.7532 
5 0.1844 0.1503 0.7419 0.1936 0.1279 0.7408 0.2023 0.1205 0.7330 
6 0.2952 0.0425 0.7426 0.2306 0.0780 0.7574 0.2176 0.0847 0.7719 
7 0.2265 0.0685 0.7888 0.1869 0.1246 0.7622 0.1537 0.1617 0.7851 
8 0.2958 0.0497 0.7389 0.2579 0.0981 0.7040 0.0844 0.3356 0.7121 
9 0.2004 0.1649 0.6969 0.1555 0.2329 0.6696 0.0587 0.3985 0.6450 
10 - loser 0.0400 0.4340 0.5957 -0.1795 0.2620 0.5812 -0.4600 0.0526 0.5879 
 
Panel B: 3FGM 
 
Deciles  
(f,h)= 12/12 
 
 
(f,h)= 12/3 
 
(f,h)=12/1 
Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.4951 0.0332 0.6433 0.6080 0.0099 0.6415 0.9326 0.0001 0.6041 
2 0.5746 0.0036 0.6921 0.5851 0.0032 0.6715 0.7480 0.0001 0.6658 
3 0.3456 0.0262 0.7317 0.5142 0.0011 0.7397 0.6149 0.0002 0.7565 
4 0.3834 0.0141 0.7458 0.3759 0.0150 0.7684 0.3586 0.0167 .0.7756 
5 0.2785 0.0519 0.7616 0.2840 0.0412 0.7606 0.2932 0.0383 0.7528 
6 0.3422 0.0226 0.7478 0.2639 0.0521 0.7611 0.2604 0.0504 0.7764 
7 0.2315 0.0657 0.7948 0.2331 0.0774 0.7712 0.1954 0.1109 0.7892 
8 0.3500 0.0282 0.7477 0.3221 0.0486 0.7156 0.1125 0.2881 0.7199 
9 0.2566 0.1003 0.7034 0.2246 0.1417 0.6792 0.1295 0.2747 0.6565 
10 - loser 0.1786 0.2397 0.6265 -0.0471 0.4362 0.6065 -0.3240 0.1261 0.6156 
 
Panel C: 4FGM 
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 12/12 
 
 
(f,h)= 12/3 
 
(f,h)=12/1 
Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.5924 0.0158 0.6535 0.6520 0.0068 0.6438 0.9685 <0.0001 0.6056 
2 0.6720 0.0010 0.7071 0.6660 0.0007 0.6823 0.8118 0.0001 0.6726 
3 0.4392 0.0054 0.7481 0.6054 0.0001 0.7564 0.6747 <0.0001 0.7634 
4 0.4765 0.0025 0.7623 0.4655 0.0029 0.7822 0.4502 0.0041 0.7902 
5 0.3992 0.0062 0.7892 0.3883 0.0063 0.7826 0.3990 0.0071 0.7755 
6 0.5007 0.0009 0.7972 0.4159 0.0029 0.8079 0.3972 0.0026 0.8148 
7 0.3725 0.0042 0.8346 0.3558 0.0115 0.8008 0.3369 0.0116 0.8277 
8 0.5093 0.0012 0.7927 0.5280 0.0006 0.7871 0.3461 0.0197 0.8084 
9 0.4537 0.0053 0.7685 0.4593 0.0057 0.7688 0.3788 0.0215 0.7580 
10 - loser 0.3885 0.0434 0.6864 0.1989 0.2130 0.6773 -0.0634 0.3995 0.6955 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6  Persistence in Alpha: Funds Sorted by t-alpha using NAV Returns and the One-Factor Benchmark Model (1FBM)  
 
Funds are sorted into past ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ deciles using NAV returns and the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM). The table reports alphas 
(and bootstrap p-values) for post-formation fund-price returns using the one-factor global model (1FGM, Panel A), the three-factor global model 
(3FGM, Panel B) and the four-factor global model (4FGM, Panel C). The formation (f) and holding (h) periods (f,h) are 12/12, 12/6 and 12/1 
months.  The 1FGM uses the excess return on a global stock market index, the 3FGM also includes global factors for size and book-to-market; the 
4FGM adds a momentum variable.  The investment horizon is 17 years (204 months), starting in January 1996 and ending in December 2012.   
 
 
 
Panel A: 1FGM 
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 36/12 
 
 
(f,h) = 36/3 
 
(f,h) = 36/1 
Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.3505 0.0573 0.6453 0.4652 0.0197 0.6180 0.6007 0.0027 0.6327 
2 0.3676 0.0435 0.6604 0.4633 0.0111 0.7040 0.5735 0.0008 0.7221 
3 0.1157 0.2832 0.7136 0.1856 0.1570 0.7520 0.2920 0.0565 0.7504 
4 0.4123 0.0154 0.7237 0.3344 0.0454 0.7090 0.3944 0.0261 0.7226 
5 0.2462 0.0933 0.7333 0.3589 0.0255 0.7434 0.1998 0.1544 0.7116 
6 0.2365 0.1068 0.7330 0.1128 0.2818 0.7305 0.2672 0.0716 0.7349 
7 0.1856 0.1556 0.7170 0.2899 0.0511 0.7329 0.1298 0.2174 0.7518 
8 0.3578 0.0272 0.7467 0.0296 0.4428 0.7027 0.1333 0.2661 0.6617 
9 0.3222 0.0491 0.7058 0.2287 0.1195 0.6909 0.0527 0.3911 0.7025 
10 - loser 0.2227 0.1474 0.6621 0.2726 0.1133 0.6545 0.0817 0.3571 0.6429 
 
Panel B: 3FGM 
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 36/12 
 
 
(f,h) = 36/3 
 
(f,h) = 36/1 
alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.4989 0.0077 0.6875 0.6126 0.0017 0.6621 0.7563 0.0001 0.6824 
2 0.5001 0.0065 0.6965 0.6046 0.0002 0.7464 0.7033 0.0001 0.7595 
3 0.2613 0.0799 0.7561 0.2983 0.0444 0.7771 0.4165 0.0080 0.7817 
4 0.5061 0.0028 0.7430 .0.4446 0.0097 0.7352 0.5247 0.0019 0.7560 
5 0.3268 0.0303 0.7515 0.4182 0.0102 0.7550 0.2560 0.0932 0.7227 
6 0.2934 0.0568 0.7406 0.1602 0.1931 0.7351 0.3259 0.0335 0.7422 
7 0.2225 0.1171 0.7204 0.3602 0.0202 0.7440 0.1806 0.1425 0.7580 
8 0.4141 0.0114 0.7535 0.0878 0.3252 0.7096 0.1976 0.1722 0.6703 
9 0.3679 0.0285 0.7124 0.2904 0.0648 0.7016 0.1256 0.2516 0.7139 
10 - loser 0.2962 0.0781 0.6752 0.3467 0.0599 0.6667 0.1361 0.2757 0.6543 
 
Panel C: 4FGM 
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 36/12 
 
 
(f,h) = 36/3 
 
(f,h) = 36/1 
alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.6361 0.0005 0.7180 0.7316 <0.0001 0.6862 0.8709 <0.0001 0.7045 
2 0.6443 0.0004 0.7313 0.6891 <0.0001 0.7589 0.7842 <0.0001 0.7713 
3 0.3718 0.0214 0.7753 0.4088 0.0079 0.7970 0.5056 0.0011 0.7954 
4 0.6284 0.0002 0.7681 0.5994 0.0007 0.7737 0.6716 0.0001 0.7892 
5 0.4463 0.0054 0.7774 0.5553 0.0006 0.7887 0.3959 0.0149 0.7567 
6 0.4083 0.0117 0.7636 0.2714 0.0694 0.7565 0.4441 0.0066 0.7671 
7 0.3783 0.0127 0.7662 0.4935 0.0011 0.7776 0.3221 0.0202 0.7969 
8 0.5929 0.0002 0.8105 0.2722 0.0604 0.7674 0.3925 0.0180 0.7360 
9 0.5101 0.0018 0.7475 0.4713 0.0039 0.7619 0.3085 0.0348 0.7744 
10 - loser 0.4528 0.0115 0.7164 0.5205 0.0070 0.7133 0.3204 0.0622 0.7058 
 
 
  
Table 7   Persistence in Alpha: Funds Sorted by t-alpha using Fund-Price Returns and the Four-Factor Benchmark Model (4FBM)  
 
Funds are sorted into past ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ deciles using fund-price returns and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM). The four factors are 
the self-declared benchmark and the global risk factors SMB, HML and MOM.  The table reports alphas (and bootstrap p-values) for post-
formation fund-price returns using the four-factor global model (4FGM). The formation (f) and holding (h) periods (f,h) are 12/12, 12/6 and 12/1 
months.  The 4FGM uses the excess return on a global stock market index, global factors for size, book-to-market and momentum.  The 
investment horizon is 17 years (204 months), starting in January 1996 and ending in December 2012.   
 
 
Deciles  
(f,h) = 36/12 
 
 
(f,h) = 36/3 
 
(f,h) = 36/1 
Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  Alpha p-value 2R  
1 - winner 0.5234 0.0017 0.7635 0.5165 0.0019 0.7543 0.5028 0.0024 0.7583 
2 0.4308 0.0074 0.7740 0.2746 0.0458 0.8000 0.2145 0.0902 0.8083 
3 0.3474 0.0347 0.7418 0.3643 0.0255 0.7594 0.3184 0.0371 0.7704 
4 0.4312 0.0060 0.7813 0.3883 0.0108 0.7639 0.4175 0.0111 0.7535 
5 0.4655 0.0047 0.7620 0.6332 0.0002 0.7750 0.7980 <0.0000 0.7707 
6 0.6034 0.0001 0.7916 0.5110 0.0020 0.7734 0.4634 0.0052 0.7429 
7 0.4316 0.0095 0.7643 0.4275 0.0070 0.7472 0.4588 0.0066 0.7205 
8 0.5927 0.0011 0.7308 0.5995 0.0009 0.7522 0.4465 0.0078 0.7634 
9 0.6350 0.0002 0.7493 0.5762 0.0019 0.7414 0.7056 0.0001 0.7431 
10 - loser 0.6581 0.0009 0.7010 0.7522 0.0002 0.7008 0.7370 0.0004 0.7093 
 
 
 
 
